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Awash with feelings of good will in reaching an agreement, parties to
an international commercial transaction often give little thought to the
drafting of the arbitration clause,' and even less thought to the optimal
site for conducting the arbitration. When the parties do consider the site,
they often limit consideration to its neutrality, its general legal climate,
and its status as a signatory to the New York Convention on the Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York
Convention) 2-the preeminent treaty governing the enforcement of for-
eign arbitral awards in some seventy states.
Typically, negotiating parties overlook the rights of appeal and review
in the jurisdiction selected. Such rights, however, can seriously affect the
finality of the arbitral award, the cost of the arbitral process (by including
an appellate stage), and the speed by which the award can be enforced
abroad.
First and foremost, the scope of review of an arbitral award in the
chosen jurisdiction can make enforcement of the award more difficult than
if the same award were rendered by the same arbitrators but in another
jurisdiction with a more limited scope of review. The beauty of the New
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1. In addition to the place of arbitration, an arbitration clause should generally include
the following: (I) the type of disputes covered by the arbitration clause; (2) the number of
arbitrators; (3) the procedural rules by which to conduct the arbitration, e.g., ICC Rules of
Conciliation and Arbitration; (4) the language in which the arbitration is to be conducted;
and (5) the substantive law to govern the dispute. For further discussion on the content of
an arbitration clause, see Golsong, A Guide to Procedural Issues in International Arbitration,
18 INT'L LAW. 633 (1984).
2. June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
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York Convention is that awards rendered in member jurisdictions are
easily enforced in any of the approximately seventy other signatory states,
subject to the following narrowly defined challenges: 3
" invalidity of the arbitral agreement;
* a violation of due process;
* the arbitrator's exceeding his authority;
" irregularity in the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral
procedure;
* nonarbitrability of the dispute;
" violation of public policy; or
* failure of the award to become binding, or its suspension or setting
aside in the country where made.
However, in contrast to the limited bases for challenge permitted under
the first six defenses, the last defense, in effect, incorporates the entire
body of review rights in the issuing jurisdiction: a successful appeal of an
award in the issuing state can prevent its enforcement abroad. Specifically,
under article V, section l(e) of the New York Convention, a court can
refuse recognition and enforcement of an award when "the award ...
has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country
in which ... that award was made." If the scope of judicial review in the
rendering state extends beyond the other six defenses allowed under the
New York Convention, the losing party's opportunity to avoid enforce-
ment is automatically enhanced: The losing party can first attempt to
derail the award on appeal on grounds that would not be permitted else-
where during enforcement proceedings.
In addition, even the mere initiation of an appellate or review process
in the rendering state risks delay of the award's enforcement elsewhere.
Under article VI of the New York Convention, recognition and enforce-
ment may be adjourned if an application for setting aside or suspending
the award has been made to a competent authority in the country where
the award was rendered. 4 The greater the potential for review in the
rendering jurisdiction, the greater the risk that this avenue for attack will
be taken.
To assist practitioners in selecting a site that will promote finality once
an award is rendered, this article examines appellate rights in six juris-
dictions utilized for conducting international arbitrations: the United States,
3. Id. art. V.
4. Id. art. VI. See Spier v. Calzaturificio Techica S.P.A., 663 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (adjournment of enforcement proceeding abroad proper unless challenge to award in
rendering jurisdiction is transparently frivolous); Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management
Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981), reconsideration denied, 530 F. Supp. 542 (S.D.
Ohio 1982). The authority in the country where enforcement is sought may, upon application,
order the party resisting enforcement to give "suitable" security.
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England, Australia, France, Sweden, and Switzerland. 5 The opportunity
for the parties to waive the right of review in their contract-and thus
avoid the uncertainties and costs of an appellate stage-is also explored.
1. The U.S. Arbitration Act
. The United States is occasionally overlooked as a hospitable site for
international arbitrations. The Federal Arbitration Act, 6 however, which
governs arbitrations based on a written arbitration clause in any contract
evidencing, inter alia, a transaction involving interstate or foreign com-
merce, 7 provides a comparatively limited basis-in terms of both time
and substance-for reviewing the resulting arbitral award.
A. TIMING FOR REVIEW
Under the Act, any party, within three months after the arbitration
award is filed or delivered, may apply to vacate, modify, or correct it;
however, a party has one year after the award is made to apply to the
appropriate court for an order confirming it.8 Furthermore, courts have
held that once the three-month period for noticing a motion to vacate (or
modify or correct) an award has expired, a party may not make a motion
to vacate as a defense to, or raise such defenses in opposition to, a
subsequent motion for confirmation. 9
While the right to apply to vacate an award is automatic, 10 an application
to confirm the award is only possible when "the parties in their agreement
have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered" upon the
arbitration award. I" U.S. courts have generally found the requisite agree-
ment to entry of a judgment implied by the language or behavior of the
parties or incorporated by reference by the parties' selection of a set of
arbitration rules that themselves provide that a judgment may be entered
5. All are parties to the New York Convention.
6. 9 U.S.C. § I et seq. (1982).
7. Id. §§ I, 2. The Federal Arbitration Act also applies to written arbitration clauses in
any maritime transaction. However, an argument could be made that the Federal Arbitration
Act does not apply to an arbitration between two foreign parties where U.S. foreign com-
merce is not involved.
8. Id. §§ 12, 9, respectively. Further, in the event the award is considered a "non-
domestic" award, see infra text part C, a party will have the three-year period provided
under 9 U.S.C. § 207 within which to confirm it.
9. E.g., Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1984), Tokura Constr. Co.
v. Corporacion Raymond, S.A., 533 F. Supp. 1274 (S.D. Tex. 1982). Contra, e.g., Chauffeurs
Union No. 364 v. Ruan Transp. Corp., 473 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
10. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 12 (1982).
II. Id. § 9.
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upon the award. 12 In Varley v. Tarrytown Associates Inc., 13 however, the
Second Circuit reversed a judgment confirming an arbitral award because
the court did not have jurisdiction to confirm the award when the parties
did not provide in their agreement that a judgment of the court could be
entered upon the award. 14
B. THE SUBSTANCE OF REVIEW
The basis on which to vacate an arbitration award under the Federal
Arbitration Act is narrow. Mere errors of law or mistakes of fact are not
grounds for vacating an award. 15 Rather, a court may vacate the award
only upon the following limited grounds:16
(a) .. .the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;(b) ... there was evident partiality or corruption by the arbitrators, ... ;17
(c) . . .the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights
of any party have been prejudiced;
(d) ...the arbitrators exceeded their powers, 18 or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.19
12. E.g., Smiga v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 766 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1985) (court
which orders arbitration retains jurisdiction to determine motion to confirm award); Mil-
waukee Typographical Union v. Newspapers, Inc., 639 F.2d 386, 389-90 (7th Cir. 1981);
I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 426-27 (2d Cir. 1974);
Compania Chilena de Navegacion Interoceanica, S.A. v. Norton Lilly & Co., 652 F. Supp.
1512, 1515 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (language in clause that award would be "final and binding"
sufficient); Ingvold Stad v. Kings Wharf Island Enterprises, 593 F. Supp. 997, 1002-03 (D.
St. Croix 1984); Paley Assocs. v. Universal Woolens, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); see also Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 276 (1932).
13. 477 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1973).
14. The arbitration clause in Varley provided that any dispute would be settled pursuant
to the rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), but at that time the rules of
the AAA did not provide that the parties were deemed to consent to the entry of a judgment
upon the award, as they do now. In Compania Chilena de Navegacion tnteroceanica, S.A.
v. Norton Lilly & Co., 652 F. Supp. 1512, 1515 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), the court called Varley
"highly questionable."
15. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 n.4 (1956) (whether arbitrators mis-
construed a contract is not open to judicial review); Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469
F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972); Reynolds Secs.. Inc. v. MacQuown, 459 F. Supp. 943, 945
(W.D. Pa. 1978).
16. 9 U.S.C. § 9, 10 (1982). The court may direct a rehearing if the award is vacated
and the time forrendering the award has not expired. Id. § 10(e).
17. Mere appearance of bias that might disqualify a judge is insufficient to constitute
"evident partiality." Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1984).
18. In one case in which the record demonstrated "an unambiguous and undisputed
mistake of fact and the record demonstrate[d] strong reliance on that mistake by the arbi-
trator," the arbitrator was held to have exceeded his powers. National Post Office Mail-
handlers v. U.S. Postal Serv., 751 F.2d 834, 843 (6th Cir. 1985).
19. An attack that the award was not mutual, final, and definite cannot be based on the
contention that certain minor disputes were not specifically disposed of in the award. Bal-
lantine Books, Inc. v. Capital Distrib. Co., 302 F.2d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1962).
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These grounds are similar to, and in certain respects more narrow than,
those allowed to challenge enforcement of an award under the New York
Convention.20
Admittedly, several additional grounds exist under the Federal Arbi-
tration Act upon which an award can be attacked; none of them, however,
creates significant opportunities for challenge not authorized by the New
York Convention.
First, under the Federal Arbitration Act an award may be vacated for
violating public policy 2' although no such reference is made in section 10
of the Act. However, this basis is consistent with the New York Con-
vention, which provides that enforcement can be denied when contrary
to public policy.22
Second, an award can be attacked under the Federal Arbitration Act
for dealing with a subject that is not arbitrable. 23 Again, such a ground
is authorized under the New York Convention. 24 Further, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has increasingly narrowed the areas that can be considered
"nonarbitrable" in the context of international arbitrations. For example,
in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.25 the U.S. Supreme Court distinguished
its earlier holding in Wilko v. Swan26 that claims arising under section
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 were not arbitrable. The Court ordered
arbitration of a claim arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
on the grounds the latter claim arose in the context of an international
contract, thus invoking considerations and policies significantly different
from the domestic context. The present trend toward narrowing the area
of nonarbitrability is evidenced in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon,27 in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld, even in the do-
20. For instance. § 10(d) of the Federal Arbitration Act (arbitrators exceeded their powers)
is like art. V(I)(c) of the Convention (the award deals with a difference not contemplated
by the submission to arbitration). Section 10(c) (arbitral misconduct in the proceedings) is
similar to art. V(I)(b) (party is unable to present his case), but in some respects § 10's
language is more narrow since arbitral misconduct may not always be an element in a party's
inability to present its case.
21. Local No. P-1236 v. Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1982); Revere Copper
& Brass v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 628 F.2d 81, 83 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
983 (1980); Local Union 1160 v. Busy Beaver Building Centers, 616 F. Supp. 812 (W.D. Pa.
1985).
22. New York Convention, supra note 2, art. V(2)(b).
23. Id. Such challenges will normally be raised in opposition to an application to compel
arbitration.
24. Id. art. V(2)(a).
25. 417 U.S. 506, 515-20 (1974).
26. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
27. In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987), the Supreme
Court refused to extend Swan's reasoning to a claim brought under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act. It distinguished Swan on the grounds that there the Court had judged ar-
bitration inadequate to enforce the statutory rights created by § 12(2) of the Securities Act
of 1933, but that the SEC now had sufficient statutory authority to ensure arbitration was
adequate to vindicate Securities Exchange Act rights in an arbitration to be conducted under
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mestic context, arbitration of claims under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) Act. Also in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth28
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that antitrust claims arising under the
Sherman Act were arbitrable in the context of an international commercial
transaction.
Nonarbitrability is not yet extinct as a ground for challenge, however.
For example, in its recent ruling in Shearson/American Express, Inc., the
Supreme Court stated that it reads Wilko v. Swan as requiring a judicial
forum "where arbitration is inadequate to protect the substantive rights
at issue." 29 And in Mitsubishi, which ruled that antitrust claims were
arbitrable, the Supreme Court expressly left open the issue whether an-
titrust claims would be arbitrable if U.S. law were not applied. The Su-
preme Court noted that if "the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses
operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue
statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation
in condemning the agreement as against public policy." ,30 Since the arbitral
tribunal may not make known its determination of the choice of law until
the time of the arbitral award, the first time at which a party might attack
an arbitration on the grounds of nonarbitrability may be at the time of
appellate review.31
Nevertheless, in the international commercial context, the possibility
of vacating an arbitral award on public policy or nonarbitrability grounds
is extremely limited given the continuing narrowing of those bases under
the Federal Arbitration Act.
Finally, an award may be vacated under the Federal Arbitration Act on
the judicially developed ground of "manifest disregard of the law," a
ground first mentioned by the Supreme Court in Wilko v. Swan32 and not
addressed by the Supreme Court again. However, the courts have been
unreceptive to vacating awards on such grounds, 33 and, as stated earlier,
mere errors of law or mistakes of fact are not grounds for vacating an
the rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers or the New York or American
Stock Exchanges.
28. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
29. 107 S. Ct. at 2339.
30. 473 U.S. at 637 n.19.
31. Failure to raise the challenge at the earliest appropriate opportunity, however, may
be deemed to waive the challenge. See Comprehensive Accounting Corp. v. Rudell, 760
F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1985).
32. 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953). See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union
No. 420 v. Kinney Air Conditioning Co., 756 F.2d 742,746 (9th Cir. 1985); Drayer v. Krasner,
572 F.2d 348, 352 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 948 (1978).
33. See, e.g., Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian Chemicals Corp., 656 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
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award. 34 To establish "manifest disregard" the arbitrator must have cor-
rectly stated and understood, but deliberately ignored, the law.35 Indeed,
courts have questioned the continuing validity of this judicial ground, 36
and a good argument exists that a U.S. court should not attempt to apply
it when the governing law of the arbitrated dispute is foreign. The difficulty
of determining a manifest disregard of the law in the context of a foreign
legal issue, combined with the international character of the arbitration,
makes application of a nonstatutory ground undesirable.
Hence, except for a challenge of "manifest disregard of the law"--an
exceedingly difficult standard to prove-review under the Federal Arbi-
tration Act provides little scope to attack an award which could not also
be successfully challenged abroad under the New York Convention.
C. REVIEW OF NONDOMESTiC AWARDS
Intriguingly, in some circumstances an award rendered in the United
States may be reviewed directly on the basis of the New York Convention,
instead of the Federal Arbitration Act. Normally, the New York Conven-
tion applies to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards outside
the rendering jurisdiction. However, by its own terms, it also applies to
arbitral awards "not considered as domestic awards" in the state where
recognition and enforcement are sought. Accordingly, in Bergesen v. Jo-
seph Muller Corp.37 the Second Circuit stated that a party with a "non-
domestic award" rendered in the United States could proceed to review
the award under either the Federal Arbitration Act or the New York
Convention. Nondomestic awards, according to the court, included those
rendered in the United States that were pronounced in accordance with
foreign law or involved parties domiciled or having their principal place
of business outside of the United States. 38
34. See supra note 15. Nevertheless, "an evident material miscalculation of figures" or
an "evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred
to in the award" is a basis for modification or correction. 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1982).
35. Office of Supply, Gov't of Rep. of Korea v. N.Y. Navigation Co., 469 F.2d 377, 379
(2d Cir. 1972); Refino v. Feuer Transp., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 562, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd,
633 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1980).
36. I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 431 (2d Cir. 1974)
(discussing Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d
805, 808 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960)); Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian
Chemicals Corp., 656 F. Supp. 160, 164-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); see also Parsons & Whittemore
Overseas Co. v. Socidtd Gdndrale de l'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 977 (2d
Cir. 1974) (questioning "manifest disregard" in the international commercial context in
reference to the New York Convention).
37. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983).
38. The Bergesen court's definition of a "nondomestic award" has been criticized. See
van den Berg, When Is an Arbitral Award Nondomestic under the New York Convention of
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In such a circumstance, the party seeking confirmation of the award
would have the benefit of the three-year statute of limitations under
9 U.S.C. § 207, rather than the one-year period under 9 U.S.C. § 9.
Further, in the case of a "nondomestic award" rendered in the United
States, the grounds of "manifest disregard of the law" to vacate the award
would be unavailable by which to challenge the award under the New
York Convention. 39
D. WAIVER OF REVIEW
Parties who wish to avoid any of the risks of review can exclude judicial
review under the Federal Arbitration Act and thus enhance the finality of
their award. A contractual waiver of all judicial review of the arbitration
proceedings, if clear and unequivocal, is valid. 40 Conversely, parties may
agree to expand the grounds upon which an award is reviewed. 41
E. CONCLUSION
The selection of the United States as an arbitral site does not expand
the losing party's scope for challenging the award under the New York
Convention, since the grounds for vacating an award under the Federal
Arbitration Act are similar to, and arguably narrower than, those for
refusing recognition of an award under the New York Convention (except
for the ground of manifest disregard for the law). Both the New York
Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act will deny enforcement of an
award that is contrary to public policy; both will reject an award made
beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement; and both will refuse en-
forcement when there is a denial of due process (although the U.S. Act
focuses on the misconduct of the arbitrators, whereas the Convention is
directed at the parties' opportunity to present their case).
1958? 6 PACE L. REV. (1985). Dr. van den Berg concludes, based on the legislative history
and text of the Convention, that a nondomestic award is one made in the rendering state
that is governed, by agreement, by the arbitration law of another country.
39. Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian Chemicals Corp., 656 F. Supp. 160, 167 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); see also Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Socidtd Gdndrale de l'Industrie du
Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 977 (2d Cir. 1974). Indeed, one could argue that if the New
York Convention applies, no inconsistent provision of the Federal Arbitration Act should.
See 9 U.S.C. § 208. Further, where the foreign commerce of the U.S. is not involved, the
Federal Arbitration Act may not be applicable in any event.
40. The intention to waive all judicial review must be clear. Aerojet-General Corp. v.
American Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 251-52 (9th Cir. 1973) ("Ordinary language to
the effect that the [arbitrator's] decisions shall be 'final and binding' has been held not to
preclude some judicial review.").
41. In re Fils et Cables d'Acier de Lens, 584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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Further, the U.S. courts have adopted a very strict reading of the
grounds for vacating an arbitration award. 42 Admittedly, the judicial de-
velopment of the standard of manifest disregard of the law, as a basis to
vacate an award, provides a ground for challenge not sanctioned under
the New York Convention. However, U.S. courts have virtually always
rejected it when raised; it would normally be difficult to establish since
the reasons for an award are not required to be set forth under U.S. law;
and finally, it would probably be found unavailable as a basis for challenge
in the case of a nondomestic award.
II. England
Arbitrations in England are governed by the English Arbitration Acts
of 1950, 1975, and 1979. Prior to the enactment of the 1979 Act, judicial
review of arbitrations in England was extensive, partly owing to the phi-
losophy that such review provided greater certainty and predictability in
the arbitral decision. The 1979 Act attempted to reform and limit judicial
review in England (while retaining some of its benefits) on the grounds
that extensive judicial review affected the speed and finality of the arbitral
decision. The 1979 Act reformed judicial review in three principal re-
spects: (1) judicial review was limited, (2) the "case stated" procedure
was abolished, and (3) judicial review could be waived by means of an
exclusion agreement entered by the parties.
A. SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Perhaps the greatest reform under the Act is its limitation on appeal
rights. Prior to the 1979 Act, and in contrast with the scope of challenge
under the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act, the
English courts could set aside any arbitral award based on an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law. Under the 1979 Act, the English courts, spe-
cifically, the High Court, no longer have jurisdiction to set aside or remit
an award on the basis of "errors of fact or law on the face of the award." 43
Instead, the High Court may confirm, vary, or set aside an arbitration
award on the basis of any question of law only if certain conditions are
satisfied. 44 First, an appeal may be brought only upon all the parties'
consent or upon leave of the court. 45 Second, to grant leave, the High
42. E.g., Sperry Int'l Trade, Inc. v. Government of Israel, 532 F. Supp. 901, 905 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 689 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982).
43. Arbitration Act, 1979, § 1(I).
44. Id. § 1(2).
45. Id. § 1(3).
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Court must conclude that "the determination of the question of law con-
cerned could substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties
to the arbitration agreement." 46 Finally, the court may make leave con-
ditional upon the appellant's satisfaction of any conditions the court deems
appropriate.
Hence, any appeal must be agreeable to all parties or be of such a
material nature that leave of the court is appropriate. In the latter instance,
such leave can be conditioned upon protective measures, such as the
payment of security to enhance the prevailing party's opportunity to
enforce the award after appeal, if the award is upheld.
If a party wishes to appeal from the High Court's decision, the High
Court or the Court of Appeal must grant leave to appeal and the High
Court must certify that the question of law is either one of general public
importance or that it should be considered for some other special reason.47
Prior to the 1979 Act, the power of the English courts to set aside any
arbitral award based on an erroneous conclusion of fact or law resulted
in a reluctance by English arbitrators to give reasons for their awards.
Yet, various countries required reasoned awards. 48 Under the 1979 Act,
upon application by any party and with all the parties' consent or leave
of the Court, the High Court may order the arbitrator to state the reasons
for the award, to assist a court's review of any question of law arising
thereunder.49 The High Court, however, may not make this order unless
one of the parties gave the arbitrator notice that a reasoned award would
be required, or a "special reason" for the absence of such notice exists. 50
B. REVIEW OF PRELIMINARY POINTS OF LAW
In another departure from the past, under section 2 of the 1979 Act,
the High Court can determine any preliminary points of law arising during
the course of the arbitration only if either the arbitrator or all of the parties
consent. 51 In such cases, the court must first satisfy itself that the pre-
46. Id. § 1(4). The question must be one of "practical importance-not an academic
point-nor a minor point." Pioneer Shipping Ltd. v. B.T.P. Tioxide Ltd. (The Nema), [1980]
3 W.L.R. 326, 335 (C.A.).
47. Arbitration Act, 1979, § 1(7). Interpretation of a clause in a standard form contract
which is likely to come up again may well be an issue of general public importance. Pioneer
Shipping Ltd. v. B.T.P. Tioxide, Ltd., [1980] 3 W.L.R. 326, 335 (C.A.).
48. COMMERCIAL COURT COMMITTEE, REPORT ON ARBITRATION (presented to Parliament
July 1978).
49. Arbitration Act, 1979, § 1(5).
50. Id. § 1(6). A genuine misunderstanding may be such a special reason. See Mondial
Trading Co. GmbH v. Gill & Duffus Zuckerhandelsgesellschaft GmbH, [1980] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 376.
51. Arbitration Act, 1979, § 2(I).
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liminary question of law is one upon which leave to appeal would likely
be granted, thus incorporating the requirement that the determination of
the question substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties. 52
Finally, the court must conclude that the determination of the preliminary
point could produce substantial savings in costs to the parties. 53
C. WAIVER OF RIGHT TO REVIEW
A principal advantage of the English reforms is that for most interna-
tional arbitrations parties may exclude in advance the right of appeal by
entering into a written exclusion agreement by which judicial review is
precluded 54 (except to correct misconduct on the part of the arbitrators
or improper procurement of the award 55). An exclusion agreement can
exclude judicial review (except for misconduct or improper procurement),
judicial determination of preliminary points, and even an order for a rea-
soned award. 56
The right to enter into an exclusion agreement, however, depends upon
the type of arbitration involved. If the arbitration agreement is domestic,
an exclusion agreement is valid only if it is entered into after the arbitra-
tion's commencement or the question of law arises. 57 Even if an arbitration
agreement is not domestic, if the dispute falls within the High Court's
admiralty jurisdiction or arises out of an insurance or commodity contract,
the exclusion agreement has no effect unless it was entered into after the
arbitration's commencement or if the award or question of law relates to
a contract expressly designating the governing law as other than the law
of England and Wales. 58 An exclusion agreement is a nondomestic arbi-
tration agreement 59 that does not fall within the foregoing special cate-
gories-that is, most international commercial arbitrations-is effective
regardless of when it was entered or which law governs the agreement. 60
52. Id. § 2(2)(b).
53. Id. § 2(2)(a).
54. Id. § 3(I).
55. Jurisdiction to correct misconduct or set aside an improperly procured award is
provided for in the Arbitration Act, 1950, § 23, which the 1979 Act does not modify. Mis-
conduct can include an award made in excess of the arbitrator'sjurisdicticn. See A. WALTON,
RUSSELL ON THE LAW OF ARBITRATION 481 (19th ed. 1979).
56. Arbitration Act, 1979, § 3(l).
57. Id. § 3(6). A "domestic" arbitration agreement is an agreement that provides for
arbitration in the United Kingdom and to which all the parties are United Kingdom nationals
or residents at the time the arbitration agreement was entered. In the case of a corporate
entity, it must have been incorporated in, or its central management and control have been
exercised in, the United Kingdom at the time of the agreement. Id. § 3(7).
58. Id. § 4(1).
59. See note 57.
60. Id. § 3(I) and (6).
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Can a written agreement simply providing for arbitration under the rules
of conciliation and arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) Court of Arbitration constitute an exclusion agreement? After all,
ICC article 24 provides that the parties are deemed to have waived their
right to any form of appeal. 6 1 In Arab African Energy Corp. v. Oliepro-
dukten Nederland B. V.62 the Queen's Bench Commercial Court concluded
that an arbitration agreement governed by ICC rules incorporated article
24 of the ICC rules and thereby constituted a valid waiver of the right to
appeal. The court concluded:
Arbitration "according" I.C.C. rules must in my judgment mean "in conformity
with" them.
***Sec. 3(l) of the 1979 Act does not require the overt demonstration of an
intention to exclude the right of appeal. True it is, that formerly the Court was
careful to maintain its supervisory jurisdiction over arbitrators and their awards.
But that aspect of public policy has now given way to the need for finality....
In my judgment, the phrase "an agreement in writing ... which excludes the
right of appeal" is apt to apply to an exclusion agreement incorporated by
reference .63
Nevertheless, neither the waiver provision in the ICC rules nor an
exclusion agreement eliminates the right to appeal on the basis of arbi-
trator misconduct. 64
D. FINALITY OF AWARDS
One final advantage to arbitration in England is that once an arbitration
award is rendered, it is immediately enforceable. 65 Since the New York
Convention provides that recognition and enforcement of an award can
be refused where "the award has not yet become binding on the parties, 66
finality upon an award's rendition is critical to speedy enforcement. The
Commercial Court Committee, in its Report On Arbitration to the British
61. ICC Rules art. 24 provides:
1. The arbitral award shall be final.
2. By submitting the dispute to arbitration by the International Chamber of
Commerce, the parties shall be deemed to have undertaken to carry out the
resulting award without delay and to have waived their right to any form of
appeal insofar as such waiver can validly be made.
62. [19831 2 Q.B% 419.
63. Id. at 423. Compare this with the European Court's decision that the mere incor-
poration by reference of a document is insufficient to constitute an agreement in "writing"
for the purposes of jurisdictional clauses under the EEC Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of 1968. Kerr, The Arbitration
Act 1979, 43 MOD. L. REV. 45, 53-54 (1980).
64. Arbitration Act, 1979, § ](I) does not purport to void Arbitration Act, 1950, § 23(2),
relating to misconduct; therefore, an exclusion agreement, which only waives rights to appeal
under §§ I and 2 of the 1979 Act, would not apply to § 23.
65. M. MUSTILL & S. BOYD, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 569 (1982).
66. New York Convention, supra note 2, art. V(I)(e).
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Parliament, was of the opinion that under the 1979 reforms "every award
would be a final award and immediately enforceable as such, subject only
to the right of the Court in appropriate cases to impose a stay of execution
pending an appeal." 67 When a stay pending appeal is granted such that
enforcement can be denied under the New York Convention, leave to
appeal can be conditioned upon the payment of security, 68 thus discour-
aging meritless appeals designed for delay.
E. CONCLUSION
The advantages under the 1979 reform of the English Arbitration Acts
are twofold. First, parties that seek finality and enforceability upon the
rendition of an award can enter into an exclusion agreement. Such an
agreement minimizes the bases for judicial review and avoids an appellate
stage's inevitable impact on enforcement abroad. Second, when review
is not excluded, although the scope for attack is broader than that allowed
under the New York Convention, the court has discretion to condition
leave to appeal upon the payment of security or some other protective
measure. Such provisions reduce the risk that a losing party can delay
execution abroad by appealing the arbitration award at home.
III. Australia
Australia has no national statutory procedure for international arbitra-
tions. New South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia, Tasmania, South
Australia, and the Northern Territory, however, have enacted the Aus-
tralian Uniform Commercial Arbitration Act. 69 The provisions forjudicial
review in the Uniform Act essentially mirror those in England's Arbitra-
tion Act of 1979.
Like the 1979 Act, subject to the judicial review specifically authorized,
under the Uniform Act, an Australian court may not remit or set aside
an award on the ground of an error of fact or law on the face of the
award. 70 Instead, like the English Arbitration Act of 1979, any question
of law can be appealed only with the consent of all parties or leave of the
court. The latter, in turn, depends upon whether the question of law is
one that could substantially affect the rights of one or more parties. 7 1 The
Australian court may also determine a preliminary point of law on the
67. COMMERCIAL COURT COMMITTEE, supra note 48, at 9.
68. Arbitration Act, 1979, § 1(4).
69. It has also been assented to by the Australian Capital Territory. There are some
differences, however, among parallel provisions in the Act as adopted in the various states.
70. Commercial Arbitration Act, § 38().
71. Id. § 38(2), (4).
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basis of the same standards set forth in the 1979 English Arbitration Act. 7 2
Likewise, the parties may enter into an exclusion agreement to exclude
the right of appeal, 73 although an Australian court may still set aside an
award on the basis of arbitrator misconduct or where the award is im-
properly procured. 74
Accordingly, when an exclusion agreement is entered, the scope to
challenge an arbitral award rendered in Australia is narrow. Like England,
when there is no exclusion agreement, the grounds to attack an award
are broader than those authorized by the New York Convention. Unless
the arbitration agreement shows a contrary intention, the arbitration award
rendered in those jurisdictions subject to the Act is final and binding, 75
and can be enforced abroad unless set aside or suspended in Australia on
the same grounds as authorized in England.
However, unlike the 1979 English Arbitration Act, Australian awards
governed by the Uniform Commercial Arbitration Act must include a
statement of reasons unless the parties otherwise agree in writing. 7 6 While
this provision may increase the risk of an appellate finding of a basis for
overturning the award when the parties have not entered into an exclusion
agreement, in general, the standards of review of arbitration awards gov-
erned by Australia's Uniform Commercial Arbitration Act are the same
as in England.
IV. France
France adopted a new code governing international commercial arbi-
tration by decree promulgated on May 12, 1981. 77 Under French cases
decided prior to the new code's promulgation, the French Court of Appeal
had held that French courts lacked jurisdiction to hear challenges to
international arbitral awards through a direct appeal, even though the
arbitration was held in France. 78 Under the 1981 Decree, the French Court
of Appeal may now set aside an international arbitral award rendered in
France in an action for annulment on the following grounds:
e the award was made in the absence of an arbitration agreement or in
reliance on a void or expired arbitration agreement;
72. Id. § 39.
73. Id. § 40.
74. Id. § 42.
75. Id. § 28.
76. Id. § 29.
77. An international arbitration is defined as an arbitration "which deals with international
commercial interests." CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE [C. PR. civ.] art. 1492. Hence, even
arbitration between two French companies could be international if the subject matter in
dispute deals with an international matter.
78. See Judgment of Feb. 21, 1980, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1980 Recueil Dalloz, Dalloz-
Sirey, Jurisprudence, [D.S. Jur.] 568.
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" the arbitral tribunal was improperly constituted or the sole arbitrator
improperly appointed;
" the arbitrator did not comply with the mission conferred upon him;
" the parties have not been treated on an equal footing; or
" recognition or execution is contrary to international public policy.79
Hence, international arbitral awards rendered in France are not easily
challenged. Indeed, the grounds to challenge international awards are
more limited than those available in a French domestic arbitration. For
example, a French domestic award may be attacked on grounds of public
policy (ordre public). An international award, however, even if in violation
of French domestic public policy, may be attacked only if it is contrary
to "international" public policy.80 Likewise, France has no requirement
that an international award be rendered on the basis of a reasoned opinion,
in contrast to domestic awards. 81 On the other hand, a challenge to an
international arbitral award based on the failure of the arbitrator to comply
"with the mission conferred upon him" does not simply cover those
circumstances in which the arbitrator has determined an issue not sub-
mitted to him. Such grounds may include the arbitrator's application of
law other than that chosen by the parties.82
Nonetheless, the grounds for challenging an award rendered in France
are more limited than those for reviewing international arbitral awards
rendered in England or Australia (in those cases in which the parties have
not entered into an exclusion agreement).
That is not to say, of course, that a prevailing party seeking judicial
recognition of an award rendered in France takes little risk. Under French
law, a party has one month after service of the award to bring an action
for annulment. Similarly, when the prevailing party seeks judicial rec-
ognition in France, a party can challenge the ensuing decision to grant
recognition or execution upon the same grounds as an action to set aside
the award 83 if brought within one month following service of the deci-
sion. 84 Execution of the award is suspended during the one-month period
as well as the period of the challenge. 85 Hence, a challenge by the losing
party can suspend the award, and thus can affect the enforcement of the
award under the New York Convention, which under article V(1)(e) pro-
79. C. PR. CIV. arts. 1502, 1504.
80. Id. art. 1502.
81. Craig, Park & Paulsson, French Codification of Legal Framework for Int'l Commercial
Arbitration, 13 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 727, 740 (1981): VII DERAINS YEARBOOK: COM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION 11 (1982).
82. DERAINS, supra note 81, at II.
83. C. PR. civ. arts. 1502, 1504.
84. Id. art. 1503.
85. Id. art. 1506; Craig. supra note 81. at 741.
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vides that a foreign court can refuse enforcement on the grounds that the
award has been suspended.
Nonetheless, in the leading case of General National Maritime Trans-
port Co. v. Gotaverken Arendal Aktiebolag,86 a case that predates the
enactment of France's international arbitration code, the Swedish Su-
preme Court held that a mere challenge to an arbitral award rendered in
France was not sufficient grounds for refusing enforcement in Sweden.
The Swedish Supreme Court noted that the arbitration in France in that
case was conducted in accordance with the ICC rules, which provide that
the award shall be final. The Court construed section 7 of the Swedish
Act concerning Foreign Arbitration Agreements and Awards (which is
like the New York Convention's article V) to require that a foreign au-
thority must set aside or suspend enforcement of the award in order for
the Swedish courts to refuse enforcement. The mere challenge to the
award in France did not have that effect. Although section 9 of the Foreign
Arbitration Agreements Act provided that the Swedish court could post-
pone its decision when a party has applied to set aside the award in the
state where rendered, the Supreme Court declined to do so. Whether such
a decision is still valid in the face of the automatic stay provisions under
the new French code is open to question.
All in all, however, review of international arbitral awards rendered in
France is quite limited. Selection of a French arbitral site therefore will
not result in any expansion in the scope for challenge of an award beyond
that expected under the New York Convention.
V. Sweden
Swedish arbitration law is found in the Arbitration Act of 1929 and the
Act concerning Foreign Arbitration Agreements and Awards of 1929, as
amended. 87 The scope of review under Swedish law is somewhat broader
than that in France or the United States, but less so than that in England
or Australia where an exclusion agreement is not entered.
Under the Arbitration Act of 1929, unless otherwise agreed, an arbitral
decision is final and binding. No appeal is permitted on the merits, whether
86. Judgment of Aug. 13, 1979, Sup. Ct., Swed. The decision is translated into English
in Paulsson, The Role of Swedish Courts in Transnational Commercial Arbitration, 21 VA.
J. INT'L LAW 211, 244-48 (1981).
87. The discussed provisions of Sweden's Arbitration Act of 1929 apply to Swedish
awards. An award is considered "Swedish" if it is rendered in Sweden despite the fact that
the parties are foreign residents or the transaction has no connection with Sweden or Swedish
law. STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN § 7.1, at 161 (2d ed.
1984) [hereinafter ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN].
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as to findings of fact or substantive law. 88 Even the offer of false evidence,
or the discovery of new evidence is insufficient to challenge an award
successfully. 89
However, an award can be challenged based on procedural or form
defects. Defects are of two basic types: those that render an award "void"
and those that render it "voidable." An award is "void" if (a) there was
no valid arbitration agreement, (b) the award was not put in writing or
signed by the arbitrators, (c) the decision involved a nonarbitrable issue,
or (d) when the award was given, the question involved was the subject
of a pending court action. 90
An additional basis for challenge is that the award is "so obscure as to
make enforcement impossible." 91 Because such an award is unenforceable
by definition, it is "void." 92 When the award is "void" in part and for
that reason the balance of the award cannot be enforced, then the award
is deemed "void" in its entirety. 93
An award may also be set aside when it is not void, but "voidable."
In such a case, the party challenging the award must bring an action to
set aside the award within sixty days from the time that it received an
original or certified copy of the award. 94 Otherwise, the award becomes
valid and enforceable (unless it is "void") despite the existence of grounds
for challenge. An award may be challenged as "voidable" when:
" the arbitrators went beyond the matters submitted to them, 95 or ren-
dered an untimely award;
" a decision was rendered in a case in which arbitration proceedings
should not have taken place in Sweden; 96
88. Id. § I. I. If the arbitration agreement does not provide for appeal of the award, the
parties are "deemed to have consented to abide by it." If the arbitration agreement does
provide for a right of appeal, the Arbitration Act of 1929 does not apply to that agreement.
Arbitration Act, supra note 87, § 2.
89. Paulsson, supra note 86.
90. Arbitration Act, supra note 87, § 20.
91. Id. § 22.
92. ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN, supra note 87, § 5.2.2 at 146. An example of an "obscure"
award, cited in ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN, is an award that could not be enforced because
it ordered payment of interest at a specified rate but failed to state the principal upon which
the interest was based.
93. Arbitration Act, supra note 87, § 20.
94. Id. § 21.
95. If the arbitrators go beyond the prayers for relief, they have exceeded their authority,
although this might also be treated as a procedural irregularity. ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN,
supra note 87, § 5.3.2.1, at 148.
96. An arbitration cannot be instituted under the 1929 Act against any party who is a
resident outside Sweden and not subject to the jurisdiction of the Swedish courts unless
the arbitration agreement so provides or the arbitrators are granted the power to decide to
hold the proceedings in Sweden. Arbitration Act, supra note 87, § 4.
FALL 1988
710 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
" the arbitrator was disqualified or not properly appointed; 97 or
" any other procedural irregularity occurred, through no fault of the
challenging party, which "in probability" may be assumed to have
influenced the decision.98
The Swedish Arbitration Act does not require that the arbitrators give
reasons for their award. The common practice, however, is for Swedish
arbitrators to give reasons. 99
Accordingly, because awards rendered in Sweden cannot be legally
challenged with regard to substantive errors of law or fact, challenges are
limited. The result is to reduce the risk that the award will be set aside.
Nevertheless, the right to challenge an award on the basis of a procedural
irregularity arguably makes the scope of review in Sweden greater than
that allowed in France. The right to challenge an award owing to proce-
dural irregularities may be waived, however, if the party, while aware of
the irregularities, took part in the proceedings without objection.' 00 In
the event of an irregularity, a party may object and withdraw from the
proceedings or continue in the proceedings under protest.10'
Moreover, when neither party to the arbitration in Sweden is Swedish,
differences of opinion exist as to the right to challenge an award. The
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce has stated that acceptance of the ju-
risdiction of the Swedish courts should be implied whenever the arbitra-
tion takes place in Sweden. Others have argued that an arbitral award
rendered in Sweden between two foreigners has no nationality and there-
fore the Swedish courts have no interest in assuming jurisdiction. 102 Ac-
cording to this argument, the parties must raise their challenges in any
enforcement action taken abroad to enforce the award pursuant to the
grounds authorized under the New York Convention (where applicable).
In any event, the argument is largely academic. Given the limited bases
for challenge under Swedish law, the scope of review of an arbitral award
rendered in Sweden is quite similar to that allowed under the New York
Convention.
97. Although rule 13 of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) Rules provides its
own procedure for deciding upon an objection to disqualify an arbitrator, a party may still
set aside an award under the Swedish Arbitration Act even if the claim had been rejected
earlier by the SCC. ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN, supra note 87, § 5.3.2.4, at 149.
98. Arbitration Act, supra note 87, § 21.
99. ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN, supra note 87, § 5.3.3, at 156.
100. Id. § 4.6.5, at 134. The SCC Institute requires that reasons be stated in the award.
SCC rule 19.
101. ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN, supra note 87, § 4.6.5, at 134. Mere participation in the
proceedings will not amount to a waiver, absent the party's knowledge of the irregularity.
Id. § 5.3.3, at 156. On the other hand, a party may lose the right to challenge the irregularity
if the party negligently fails to become aware of it. Paulsson, supra note 86, at 227.
102. Paulsson, supra note 80, at 232-33.
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VI. Switzerland
Until the new Swiss International Arbitration Law goes into effect in
the second half of 1988, Swiss arbitration law is contained in the Inter-
national Arbitration Convention of 1969 (the Concordat) to which most
Swiss cantons are signatories. 10 3 This section describes judicial review
under the Concordat and under the new Swiss law, which will apply to
any international arbitration.
Under the Concordat, a party may bring an action to annul an arbitral
award within thirty days of the notification of the award 104 only on pro-
cedural or jurisdictional grounds, with one exception: Under Swiss law,
an award can also be annulled (or amended) if the award "is-arbitrary in
that it was based on findings which were manifestly contrary to the facts
appearing on the file, or in that it constitutes a clear violation of law or
equity."' 1 5 Hence, a party may challenge an award where the findings
can be shown to be manifestly incorrect, or even where the result, al-
though factually correct, is inequitable.
The other narrow grounds for annulment under the Concordat are:
" the arbitral tribunal was not property constituted;
" the arbitral tribunal erroneously declared itself to have or not to have
jurisdiction;
* the tribunal pronounced on points not submitted to it or failed to
make a determination on one of the items in the claim;
" there was a breach of a party's right to be heard (further defined in
article 25);
* the arbitral tribunal awarded to one of the parties something more
or different from that claimed, without authorization;
* the arbitral tribunal made its award after expiration of the time limit
imposed on it in which to accomplish its mission;
" the requirements for the content of an award (set forth in article 33)
were not obeyed 10 6 or the order was unintelligible or contradictory;
and
" the fees of the arbitrators were manifestly excessive.l07
Despite somewhat broader grounds for challenge than in Sweden or
France, the Concordat expressly provides that the institution of an action
to annul an award shall not have the effect of suspending it, although the
103. The Concordat is not applicable in four cantons: Aargau, Glarus, Lucerne, and
Thurgau. The other 22 of Switzerland's 26 cantons, including Geneva, Basel, and (since
1985) Zurich are signatories.
104. Concordat Suisse stir L'Arbitrage (1969), art. 37.
105. Concordat art. 36(f).
106. However, the parties may waive the requirement that the reasons for the award be
given. Concordat art. 33(e).
107. Concordat art. 36.
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judicial authority "may grant it such effect" upon request. 108 Hence, the
risk that a party's initiation of an action to annul an award would provide
grounds for a competent authority abroad to refuse or delay enforcement
under article V(I)(e) of the New York Convention is minimized.
Once the Swiss judicial authority has heard the parties concerning an
action to annul the award, it may remit the award to the arbitral tribunal
and provide a period for amendment or supplementation of the award. 109
Separately, the Concordat provides for review of an award on the fol-
lowing grounds:
a. . . . it was affected by deeds which are punishable according to Swiss
law....
b. . . . it was given in ignorance of important facts in existence prior to the
award or of evidence of decisive importance, and it was impossible for the
claimant to present such facts or evidence during the proceedings. 110
An action for such review must be brought within sixty days of the date
on which the claimant becomes aware of the grounds for review, but no
later than five years after notification of the award.I'
Hence, in several areas-the arbitrary character of an award, or the
discovery of new evidence which could not have been earlier presented-
Swiss law under the Concordat provides broader grounds for challenge
than in the U.S., France, or Sweden.
However, the new Swiss International Arbitration Law (found in chap-
ter 12 of the new Swiss Federal Law on Private International Law) changes
all this. The final text of the new Swiss Law was approved by the Swiss
Parliament on December 18, 1987. It is expected to become effective
during the second half of 1988.
The new Swiss International Arbitration Law applies to all international
arbitrations, that is, arbitrations where one of the parties does not have
its domicile or habitual residence in Switzerland. After the new law goes
into effect, the Concordat will apply if the arbitration is not international
or the parties agree to exclude the new law.
The new law makes significant and salutary changes to the scope of
judicial review of international arbitral awards rendered in Switzerland.
First, under the new law, an international arbitral award may be attacked
only on the following grounds:
* When a sole arbitrator has been improperly appointed or when an
arbitral tribunal has been improperly constituted.
108. Concordat art. 38.
109. Concordat art. 39.
110. Concordat art. 41.
111. Concordat art. 42.
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* When the arbitral tribunal has wrongly declared itself to have or not
to have jurisdiction.
* When the arbitral tribunal has made a ruling which goes beyond the
issues for which it was seized or when it has failed to decide one of
the issues of the arbitration petition.
" When the equality of the parties or their right to be heard has not
been respected.
* When the award is incompatible with public policy. 1 2
Hence, the grounds for challenge under the new Swiss law correspond
closely with the bases set forth under the New York Convention, and
indeed are somewhat more narrow in certain respects. The more expan-
sive challenges permitted under the Concordat are omitted.
Another improvement of the new law is its express provision that "[an
award is final from the time that it is rendered."'' 3 This, of course, en-
hances enforcement under the New York Convention, since article V,
section 1(e) allows a challenge in the event of a failure of the award to
become binding.
Finally, in the case where both parties are foreign, Swiss law now
permits the parties to waive their right to appeal, in whole or in part.
Article 192(1) provides:
If both parties have neither their domicile, nor their habitual residence, nor an
establishment in Switzerland, they may by an express declaration in their ar-
bitration agreement or subsequent written agreement, waive all rights to appeal
the awards of the arbitral tribunal; they may also waive appeal for any or all
of the grounds listed in Article 190(2).
The question will undoubtedly arise whether ICC article 24 of the Rules
of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce
will be deemed to constitute a waiver of all rights to appeal when the
parties agree to conduct their arbitration pursuant to the ICC rules. Al-
though that article provides that the parties are deemed to waive their
right of appeal, does incorporation of that article by reference to the ICC
rules in a contract constitute an express declaration in the arbitration
agreement to waive all rights of appeal? That will depend upon the extent
to which any such waiver must be knowing, deliberate, and voluntary.
If all rights to appeal are waived and the award is nonetheless to be
enforced in Switzerland, the New York Convention is to be applied by
analogy. 114
112. Swiss International Arbitration Law art. 190(2). This has been translated from French
to English by Nancy Jackson of my office. The official English text was not available as the
proofs of this article went to the printer.
113. Id. art. 190(l).
114. Id. art. 192(2).
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Hence, Switzerland has reconciled the scope of its challenges to inter-
national arbitral awards with the New York Convention. Its new law
largely eliminates the discrepancy between the Convention and the law
of judicial review in the rendering jurisdiction.
VII. Conclusion
The extent to which a party can attack an international arbitral award
in the rendering jurisdiction can have an obvious impact on the finality,
expense and enforcement of the award. Surveying the variousjurisdictions
discussed, the right to challenge an international arbitral award would
appear to be most limited in Switzerland (under its new law), and France,
followed by Sweden. Switzerland under the Concordat, England, and
Australia would appear to be the most liberal with respect to the grounds
upon which a party can challenge an award. The United States falls be-
tween these two groups, but its scope of review is substantially similar
to that allowed in France and Sweden. Moreover, in the case of a U.S.
arbitration, where neither party to the arbitration is a U.S. national, at
least one court has ruled that any resulting award is "nondomestic" under
the New York Convention. In such a case, it could be argued that the
grounds for challenge are only those under the New York Convention and
not those under the Federal Arbitration Act-although even the court in
Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp.' 15 did not go that far.
Of course, limits on judicial review does not qualify one jurisdiction as
better than another. The disadvantage of additional cost and delay in a
jurisdiction that has a greater scope for judicial review is outweighed by
the restraint on arbitrary decision making which expanded review im-
poses. On that basis, a jurisdiction which grants parties the right to decide
in advance upon the desired scope of judicial review is optimal. Under
the Federal Arbitration Act, the new Swiss International Arbitration Law,
the English Arbitration Acts, and the Australian Uniform Commercial
Arbitration Act, the right to challenge an award can be expressly waived.
Hence, those jurisdictions do grant the contracting parties the opportunity
to choose between arbitral finality and restraint on arbitral decision making.
Still, this is not a perfect world, and parties do not have perfect fore-
sight. Rare is the contract which has a provision for every eventuality.
Although those parties which select arbitration for the purpose of avoiding
the expense and uncertainty of their subjection to their adversary's court
system would be well advised to limit the scope of judicial review, this
is not always possible. Where only a brief arbitration clause is possible,
115. 710 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1983).
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the selection of arbitrator(s), the arbitral rules and the site will be the
three most critical decisions made. Ironically, if the right of review is not
carefully considered in connection with the designation of the arbitral site,
the original purpose of agreeing to arbitration can be significantly
undermined.
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